

KURIOSITAS

Media Komunikasi Sosial dan Keagamaan

Volume 15

No.2, Desember 2022

Halaman 218-246

The Hadith Interpretations of Radical-Terrorist Groups (Reconstructing the Concepts of Caliphate, Jihad, Hijrah, Faith, and the End of Time)

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ABSTRACT

Radical groups were known to deconstruct the meaning of hadith, especially those related to the themes of the caliphate, jihad, hijrah, faith, and the end of time. They put aside the context of the background of the hadith so that it only clumped up as a text without having a fundamental historical basis. The pattern of understanding applied was also contrary to the principal rules of hadith studies which were well-known among scholars and hadith reviewers. The four radical groups examined in this study were the Ikhwanul Muslimin (IM), Hizb al-Tahrir (HT), Al-Qaeda, and the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). Despite having different characteristics of thought and movement, the four radical-terrorist groups had similarities in terms of exploiting the meaning and function of hadith to legitimize their acts of terror. This study uses qualitative research with the type of library research. Qualitative research is research used to explore findings according to clear and detailed procedures. The findings in this study confirmed the views of scholars who argued that understanding of hadith could be reduced by the interests and problems of power politics that were increasingly complex from time to time.

Keywords: Hadith; Interpretation; Radical-Terrorist Groups; Power Politics

ABSTRAK

Kelompok radikal dikenal sering mendekonstruksi makna hadits, terutama yang berkaitan dengan tema khilafah, jihad, hijrah, iman, dan akhir zaman. Mereka mengesampingkan konteks latar belakang hadits tersebut sehingga hanya memahami teks tanpa memiliki dasar sejarah fundamental. Pola pemahaman yang diterapkan juga bertentangan dengan kaidah-kaidah pokok kajian hadis yang selama ini banyak dikenal di kalangan ulama dan para pengkaji hadis. Empat kelompok radikal yang diteliti dalam penelitian ini adalah Ikhwanul Muslimin (IM), Hizb al-Tahrir (HT), Al-Qaeda, dan Negara Islam Irak dan Suriah (ISIS). Meski memiliki karakteristik pemikiran dan gerakan yang berbeda, keempat kelompok radikal-teroris ini memiliki kesamaan dalam hal pemanfaatan makna dan fungsi hadits untuk melegitimasi aksi teror mereka. Penelitian ini menggunakan penelitian kualitatif dengan jenis penelitian kepustakaan. Penelitian kualitatif digunakan untuk menggali temuan sesuai dengan prosedur yang jelas dan terperinci. Temuan dalam penelitian ini membenarkan pandangan para ulama yang berpendapat bahwa pemahaman hadits dapat tereduksi oleh kepentingan dan permasalahan politik kekuasaan yang semakin kompleks dari waktu ke waktu.

Kata Kunci: Hadits, Tafsir, Kelompok Radikal-Teroris, Politik Kekuasaan

INTRODUCTION

Islam highly upholds humanity, Allah Himself confirmed it in Surah Al-Isra verse 70, yet there are radical groups in muslim society who twist religious teachings for crime and destruction (Dauda, 2020). Some studies on acts of violence in the name of religion – particularly Islam – have found a genealogical-distortive relationship between acts of radicalism-terrorism and patterns of understanding hadith. The hadiths are interpreted textually and congeal into an understanding of violence when the meaning collides with political interests. This finding was put forward by many experts, some of whom were Anne Speckhard, Khapta Akhmedova, Mumtaz Ahmad, and Yoginder Sikand (Huda, 2015, p. 57).

Hadith is the second source of law after the Koran—which is followed by *ijma* and *qiyas*. It is also one of the main social pillars of Muslims (Azami,

2008, p. 27), as well as being a socio-political asset (Al-Khatib, 1997, p. 15-16). As a socio-political asset, history has shown that hadith texts are often used precisely for political purposes which are often inconsistent with the intent and purpose of issuing hadith. As the theological treasures of Muslims, the validity and authority of hadith are never in doubt. However, it is necessary to distinguish the texts and the understanding of hadith because when entering the area of understanding, the subjectivity factor of each interpreter will certainly animate the view of a prophetic hadith. This subjectivity of understanding has in the course of history led to consequences in the form of typological classification and religious nomenclature such as traditionalist, modernist, ritualist, sufistic, literalist, fundamentalist, progressive, liberal, and so forth (Ennis, 2011).

Likewise, socio-political factors can influence one's view in understanding the content of hadith. This places the hadith in a position that is prone to be dragged into political interests, in the sense of politicizing its meaning or fabricating its text (Al-Zarqani, n.d., p. 92). In such a position, the hadith is often used to legitimize political maneuvers and policies. In fact, in some cases, there is not only a distortion or politicization of hadith but also falsification (Al-Khathib, 1975, p. 415). The politicization of the meaning and purpose of hadith is a historical fact that has smeared the development of Muslim society. These hadiths are used for political purposes ranging from the necessity of leaders from the Quraish tribe, women's leadership, caliphate, end-time leadership, allegiance and obedience to leaders, *risywah*, and so forth. (Al-Hind, 1985, p. 584-855). Ibn Khaldun even concluded that the Arabs, where the majority are Muslims, will not be able to establish a state without religion, either in the form of prophethood, guardianship, or others (Khaldun, 2003, p. 119).

The politicization of hadith continues to this day. It can be seen from the emergence of the political movements of the Ikhwanul Muslimin (IM), Hizb-Tahrir (HT), al-Qaeda to the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The momentum of the Arab Spring (*al-Rabi' al-'Arabi*) which began in 2011 were the clearest picture of this. In Egypt, Yemen, Syria, Tunisia, Libya, and other Arab countries, these groups compete for a succession of government by claiming the legitimacy of power using religious texts and symbols. They do not even hesitate to use violence, including to those waving the same symbols of Islam.

Radical-terrorist groups often use hadith to justify violent. They interpret hadith narrowly, like when they interpret "jihad" as only war and killing (El-Guyanie, 2010, p. 59). Therefore, it is not surprising that they do not feel guilty for various violence they commit since they consider it to have justification from Islamic law, both the Koran and the hadith (Hasanzadeh & Renani, 2021). The problem is of course not in the text of the hadith, but in construction of the understanding and the use of hadith. The way radical groups understand hadith eliminates the methodology and understanding widely used by prominent hadith scholars. They understand hadith ahistorically, partially, and ignore the existence of other traditions that are not under their political mission. Radical groups also use many *daif* hadiths as their *hujjah*. They also tend to choose 'fierce' hadith over soft ones, such as preferring hadith saying the prophet was sent by sword (to conduct wars) rather than the ones saying prophet was sent to perfect morals (Akyol, 2011).

Radical groups have distinctive characters of thinking, among which are: (1). Adhere to a textual and rigid understanding, (2). Leave the *zahir* endeavor; they rely all their visions and ideas on theological matters. As a

result, radical groups tend to think utopian, (3). Idealize the past (the *salaf*). They consider the *salaf* as a total representation of the truth for all time, and (4). Adhere to a single truth. Radical groups close themselves to different views; anything that differs from their opinion is considered wrong. The labels of blame that they use vary, ranging from heresy (*tabdi'*), misguidance (*tadlil*), disobedience (*tasyrik*), to apostasy (*takfir*) (Romli, 2001, p. 125-127).

This paper is aimed to clarify the meaning and use of Prophet's hadith, including the political motivation and social background of the interpreter, which in this case is radical groups, using the scales of criticism of *sanad* and *matan* as well as the methods of interpreting hadith. The study presented in this paper uses a qualitative-descriptive-analytical approach with a data collection model in the form of library research which groups the reference sources into two, namely primary sources and secondary sources. The primary sources in this research are *Fi al-Tarbiyyah al-Jihadiyyah wa al-Bina'* by Abdullah Azzam, *Ma'alim fi al-Tariq* by Sayyid Qutb (the ideologue of the Ikhwanul Muslimin), *Nizam al-Islam* by Taqiyudin al-Nabhani (founder of Hizb-Tahrir), as well as magazines officially released by ISIS which have been translated into various languages, namely *Dabiq* and *al-Naba'* (Rizky, 2019). Other primary sources are the standard hadith books, especially *kutub al-sittah*, Imam Malik's *Muwata' Malik* (93-179 H), 'Abdullah al-Da's *Sunan al-Darimi* (d. 255 H), *Ahmad ibn Hanbal's Musnad* by Ahmad ibn Hanbal (d. 241 H), and other supporting hadith books. Further explanation of the hadiths contained in these books is taken from the *sharh* such as *Sharh al-Nawawi* by Yahya ibn Sharaf al-Nawawi (676 H) and *Fath al-Bari Sharh Sahih al-Bukhari* by Ahmad ibn 'Ali Ibn Hajar al-'Asqalani (773-852 H).

While the secondary sources used are the books of *ma'ani al-hadith* (the methodology of understanding hadith) such as *Kaifa Nata'amal ma'a al-Sunnah* and *al-Madkhal li Dirasat al-Sunnah al-Sunnah. Nabawiyah*, by Yusuf al-Qardhawi, *al-Bayan wa al-Ta'riffi Asbab Wurud al-Hadith* by Ibrahim Ibn Hamzah al -Husaini, *al-Lumma' fi Asbab al-Hadith*, by Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti, and *Maqayis Naqd Mutun al-Sunnah*, the work of Musfir 'Azmullah al-Damaini, as well as other references related to hadith, both in the sub-discipline of hadith *dirayah* and sub-hadith *riwayah*.

This study uses qualitative research with the type of library research (Sugiyono, 2015). Qualitative research is research used to explore findings according to clear and detailed procedures. This study can be used for social research, history, and so on (Moleong, 2013). This study is obtained from descriptive data derived from the behavior, speech, or writing observed by the researcher from a comprehensive and holistic perspective in the context of hadith interpretations.

The material objects in this study are hadiths related to concepts of caliphate, jihad, hijrah, faith, and the end of time. This study is a research on the interpretation of hadith used by radicalism groups as an argument and a strong reason for committing violence in several areas, especially in Indonesia. The type of library research is chosen because the data taken from this study comes from books, books, international journals, research articles, and the like with the help of library data (Ghony & Almanshur, 2014). Not only taking offline data, researchers also use online data collection, because the facts that occur can be confirmed through websites or national and international media. While the data analysis technique of this research is using Miles and Huberman, namely reducing data, presenting data, and drawing conclusions (Suwendra, 2018).

RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The Deconstruction of Hadith: Five Themes

Several themes that are most often misunderstood (or even misused) are khilafah, jihad, hijrah, takfir, and the end of time (Long & Wilner, 2014). It should be underlined that there may be differences in the emphasis on the theme of the issue or discourse of struggle between one group and another, for example, Sayyid Qutb who emphasizes the issue of God's rule of law, while Hizb-Tahrir emphasizes the urgency of establishing a caliphate. For IM, HT, and Al-Qaeda, the issue of hijrah is not very important, but it is important for ISIS. Even so, the five themes above are generally the ideological basis or main issues for all radical groups.

a. Theme 1: *Khilafah, the Illusion of Islamic State*

Based on a study of the history of radical groups starting from the Khawarij at the beginning of Islam to the ISIS that exists to this day, radical groups always have a political agenda based on ideological reasons. It is this basic similarity that makes radical-terrorist groups – even though they often differ in the technical and movement domains – focus on one thing in common; deny their government, wherever and whenever. The radical-terrorist group adheres to the ideology of *al-hakimiyah lillh* (sovereignty belongs only to Allah). This ideology leads to the belief that there is an obligation to establish a caliphate or Islamic state (Islamic state). Sayyid Qutb called it the main key to the existence of Islam. "Indeed, the existence of Islam depends on the existence or not of *hakimiyah lillh*. If this does not exist, then religion has also disappeared" (Qutb, n.d., p.1556). Qutb continues saying the establishment of a caliphate is an obligation.

He also stated, "People who have faith in a belief and legal system, they will be carried away by the nature of their faith and try to destroy the

legal system that stands on thoughts that are contrary to theirs" (Qutb, n.d.-c). He assumes that anyone who believes in the system of government will automatically deny God's system. Qutb only recognizes two types of state: the Islamic State (*Dar al-Islam*); a country controlled by Muslims, regulated using Allah's Shari'a, enforced criminal laws (*hudud*), and between Muslims defending each other. The second type is the Enemy State (*Dar al-Harb*); There are only two attitudes of Muslims regarding the country: fighting them or a ceasefire. Qutb does not recognize the concept of citizenship. For him, Islam does not recognize the citizenship system; this religion only recognizes ties of faith (Qutb, n.d.-a, p.137-138).

In line with Sayyid Qutb's thoughts above, especially regarding the sovereignty of God's law and the caliphate, Hizb al-Tahrir also believes that establishing an Islamic state is not only obligatory but also very sacred because the caliphate is the crown of all forms of obligations ordered by Allah Swt. to all Muslims. Al-Nabhani, the main character of HT, mentions the obligation to establish a caliphate with the term *taj al-furud* which means a crown for all obligations (Al-Nabhani, 2002, p.9).

In *al-Shakhsiyah al-Islamiyyah*, Taqiy al-Din al-Nabhani calls Muslims sinful if they do not try to establish the caliphate. This form of obligation was then glorified in such a way by the followers of Hizb-Tahrir at the regional level. Including Hizb-Tahrir Indonesia which calls this obligation the greatest necessity with the term *a'zam wajibat al-din* (Al-Nabhani, 2002, p. 11). Anyone who denies this greatest obligation is said to have committed the greatest sin (*akbar al-ma'asi*) with a very painful torment (Zallum, 2002, p. 18). According to the confession of former Hizb-Tahrir Indonesia activist, Ainur Rofiq in his book *Khilafah HTI dalam Timbangan*, this doctrine has become a kind of weapon for HT activists to

frighten other people, and it turns out to be quite effective. Even when the world HT congress was held on July 18, 2010, in Jakarta, a spokesman for HT Lebanon said that the HT movement has always been based on Islamic teachings; those who oppose HT's thoughts are considered to have opposed Islam itself (Al-Amin, 2017, p. 155).

The concept of the HT caliphate is universal leadership, both political and religious, for all Muslims in the world who are responsible for implementing Islamic Shari'a and law and spreading the message of Islam throughout the world. HT often refers to its concept of caliphate as *khilafah 'ala minhaj an-nubuwah*, which is claimed to be the same as the concept of caliphate in the model of the Prophet's in early Islam. With this one-sided claim, HT concludes that in order to achieve the goal of establishing a caliphate, three steps must be taken: ideological development, ideological dissemination, and ideological implementation (Ichsan & Fathurrahman, 2019).

HT, like other radical groups, uses hadith as a basis for its doctrine, one of which is the following hadith:

"Whoever dissociates himself from obedience, he will meet Allah Swt. on the Day of Resurrection without *hujjah*, and whoever dies and there is no allegiance on his shoulders, then when he dies, he dies like the *jahiliyah*." (Hiban, n.d., p. 4661)

Through a search of various hadith books, the above hadith is only found in the Sahih Muslim book in the chapter on the importance of groups/society (chapter *al-amr bi luzum al-jamaah 'inda zuhur al-fitan*) with the hadith number 1851 (Al-Naisabūrī, n.d., p.1478). As for sanad, al-Suyuti in *Kitab al-Jami' al-Sagir* assesses the quality of this hadith as *sahih* (valid) (Al-Suyuti, 2009, p. 599).

Similar to Hizb al-Tahrir, establishing a powerful political entity is one of the main political missions of ISIS. Among the traditions that they use and put forward as the basis for the obligation to establish a caliphate is the following hadiths:

"From Ibn 'Umar said, the Messenger of Allah said: "Each of you is a leader, and every leader will be held accountable for those he leads. The Imam is a leader who will be held accountable for his people." (Al-Bukhari, 1987, p. 848)

This hadith is *sahih* in a *sanad* and is quite popular because, in addition to being contained in Sahih Bukhari, this hadith is also contained in several other main hadith books such as *Muwaththa* of Imam Malik (Anas, n.d.), Sunan Abu Dawud (Sulaiman, n.d.), and Musnad Ahmad (Hanbal, 2001). In al-Bagawi's notes in *Syarh al-Sunnah*, this hadith is considered *sahih* because it was also narrated by Bukhari and Muslim with the same narration, namely from Abdullah bin Dinar (Al-Bagawi, 1983, p. 61).

For ISIS, the construction of leadership (*ra'i*) is in line with the meaning of the QS. Al-Baqarah verse 124 and QS. Al-Nur verse 55. It is a promise from Allah that He will hand over leadership to his pious servants, which in this case includes political and religious leadership. The above basis is used for the obligation as well as the responsibility to establish a caliphate (*imamah al-kubra*) for those who are already able to carry out the Shari'a ("Dabiq," n.d., p. 22). ISIS also quoted 'Umar ibn al-Khattab to strengthen their *hujjah*, especially about the necessity of establishing an entity of power, "There is no Islam without a congregation, there is no congregation without leadership (*'imarah*), and there is no leadership without loyalty." (Al-Darimi, 2004, p. 253). ISIS interpreted "leadership" as a caliphate which is an obligation and legal because it is part of the traditions or teachings of Abraham (*millah Ibrahim*). ISIS went on to claim to

be the only party that is most worthy of inheriting the Abrahamic tradition because they have committed and implemented Shari'a in a *kaffah* way ("Dabiq," n.d.-b, p. 27).

The ISIS 'caliphate' was officially announced by Abu Muhammad al-'Adnani, the spokesman for ISIS, on the first day of the month of Ramadan 1435 H. In the ISIL fatwa, the declaration of the establishment of the caliphate is at the same time with the cancellation of the pledge of allegiance to the leader or government because the global caliphate is an '*ain* obligation (the responsibility of each individual) and the limited territorial (local) government is only temporary (emergency), thus when the caliphate is established, all Muslims must declare obedience and release their previous national commitments ("Dabiq," n.d.-b, p. 19). It is different from the process of declaring Islamic groups in some areas by integrating their teachings through its local culture (Mundzir et al., 2021).

It shows that the caliphate established by ISIS is an exclusive government and does not recognize the existence and legitimacy of other governments, especially the government that governs a territory with a Muslim majority occupation. In their propaganda, they say that their caliphate was founded to restore the glory and greatness of the Muslims which had been lost for decades ("Dabiq," n.d.-a, p. 12-14).

The narrative of backwardness and the loss of glory of Muslims due to the absence of a caliphate was also conveyed by Abdullah Azzam, an al-Qaeda ideologue. To him, the absence of a caliphate is also the cause of the division of Muslims because of the absence of a leader who unites the Islamic world. Azzam likens the condition of Muslims today to cold sheep and being eaten by wolves, which is none other than the Western world. To convey his ideas about the caliphate, Azzam even wrote a special book

entitled *al-Khilafah wa Bina'uha*, to convey the urgency and obligations of the caliphate as well guidelines for restoring or rebuilding it (Azzam, 2002).

b. Theme II: *Jihad*, License to Kill

Jihad in Sayyid Qutb's concept is war, including armed attacks against the legitimate government. "We have previously agreed not to use force as a means to change the system of government or to establish Islamic law. However, we have vowed to use force when there is suppression of this organization, which runs on the methods of teaching aqidah, public education, and upholding aqidah for Islam in society. And the meaning of all this is a discussion of the (military) training of a group of people who will fight against oppression and protect this organization. Likewise, the discussion of weapons and assets is needed for this purpose. As for the training, it has been agreed to speed up their training, because if it is limited to mere theory without any (military) training and preparation, it is feared that boredom will infiltrate the youth" (Qutb, n.d.-a, p. 49-50).

Abdullah Azzam, in every book he writes, always emphasizes the obligation of jihad against infidels. In one of his books, *al-Difa' 'an Arad al-Muslimin Ahamm Furud al-A'yan*, he even classifies jihad into two categories: first, offensive jihad (*jihad al-talab*), jihad when the disbelievers are not concentrating on fighting the Muslims: it is *fardu kifayah* because fighting the enemies of Allah is a must (Azzam, 2002, p. 31). To strengthen this model of jihad, Abdullah Azzam quoted Ibn Abidin's words as saying, "it is obligatory for an imam to send spies (*sariyyah*) to a country with an infidel population (*dar al-harb*) once or twice a year. It is also obligatory for the people to assist the imam in carrying out monitoring. If an imam does not send a scout squad, then all the sins are borne by the imam." Azzam said that jihad is a coercive da'wah, every Muslim must enforce it as much as

possible so that there is nothing left on this earth other than Muslims and people who surrender (*muslim*) (Azzam, 2002, p. 32).

The second category of jihad is defensive jihad (*jihad al-daf'*), aimed to prevent infidels from entering Muslim territory. According to Azzam, this jihad is *fardu 'ain* or is most urgently carried out compared to other obligations. Azzam stressed that jihad in this condition is an obligation that do not require the permission of parents, wives, superiors, and others. Azzam also quotes the Prophet's hadith in this unconditional obligation of jihad: "A Muslim must listen and obey his obligations in difficult, easy, happy or difficult circumstances" (Al-Bukhari, 1987).

The above hadith can be found in the book of *Sahih Bukhari* with a *sanad* line from Ubadah bin Shamit (Al-Bukhari, 1987). It is also found in the book of *Sahih Muslim* from *sanad* of Abu Hurairah's history in the book of *al-Imarah*, on chapter "the obligation to obey the umara". As for ISIS, spreading propaganda encouraging and motivating the annexation of territories in the name of jihad by quoting the following hadiths that are politically understood: From Abi Hurairah said that the Prophet Saw said: "A person who dies without ever having fought and never intends to do jihad at all, then he died in one of the characteristics of a hypocrite." (Hajjaj, 2006, p. 1836).

Based on the understanding of these hadiths, ISIS states that jihad is an obligation attached to the shoulders of every Muslim (*fardlu 'ain*), and its violators are threatened with hypocrisy and other threats. Jihad is also understood as an effort to make religion belong to Allah. Because of this, anyone who does not agree with the uniformity of religion into Islam is a perpetrator of disobedience and becomes an object of jihad in the sense that it can be fought (Kassim, 2015). ISIS is very motivated to fight people they

have labelled disbelievers, hoping to be free from hell, as the Prophet said, "Unbelievers and their killers will not gather in hell", when someone they consider to be an unbeliever is killed and goes to hell then they, the killer, will automatically be freed from the hell ("Dabiq," n.d.-c, p. 44).

To legalize and motivate their violence, ISIS has also dragged two *mursal* hadiths (Thahhan, 2014, p. 56), as follows:

"I am an Apostle sent with compassion, and I am an Apostle sent with battle. Indeed, Allah sent me to bring the teachings of jihad, not to cultivate crops." ("Dabiq," n.d.-c)

The caliph of ISIS, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, added an explanation of the hadith in his lecture entitled "*Infiru Khifafa wa Thiqala*" by stating clearly that Islam was never a religion of peace, Islam was the religion of war, and the Prophet has fought Arabs and non-Arabs, reds and blacks, and has never been tired from a day of the war. Likewise, his companions and followers, to be able to conquer East and West with his sharp sword ("Dabiq," n.d.-d, p. 52-53).

The founder of Hizbut Tahrir, Taqiyudin al-Nabhani declared that jihad is to fight against any party who opposes the da'wah of Islam. On another occasion, Hizbut Tahrir interprets jihad as an effort to devote one's ability to fight in the path of Allah directly or with the help of wealth, thoughts, multiply supplies, and so forth. Hizbut Tahrir's view of jihad that is so offensive cannot be separated from their spirit of purification in Islam which prohibits adoptions of any rules from outside the Koran and hadith, in all matters, both public and private politics. They consider systems outside of the Koran and Hadith to be infidel and deviant; they must be fought (Ichsan & Fathurrahman, 2019).

c. Theme III: *Hijrah*

If Qutb interprets hijrah in a meaningful way as an attempt to leave a system that contains apostasy, and Azzam understands it as an intention to carry out jihad, ISIS interprets hijrah as a physical struggle to leave *dar al-kufr* towards *dar al-Islam*. Hijrah for ISIS is one of the principles in Islam and is therefore obligatory ("Dabiq," n.d.-e, p. 23).

ISIS then narrowed the meaning of the above hadith by saying that hijrah is moving from an infidel country to the ISIS caliphate. The obligation for ISIS-style hijrah is *fardlu 'ain*, which is imposed on every individual Muslim and has the same degree as the obligations of prayer, fasting, zakat, and hajj, so there is nothing that can invalidate the obligation of this hijrah. Therefore, a person who does not emigrate or has emigrated but intends to return to an infidel country can be punished as an apostate (Wibowo & Hapsari, 2020).

For those who do not have the opportunity to emigrate to their territory, ISIS encourages them to conduct small attacks anywhere, including in their surroundings. ISIS exploited the hadith of the Prophet about how Islam came as a foreign religion and will return to being foreign (Hanbal, n.d.) to strengthen their propaganda of hijrah. The word foreign by al-Zarqawi, an ISIS ideologue, is interpreted as a person who breaks away and leaves their people or tribe. Al-Harawi interprets 'foreigners' with those who emigrated to leave their homeland for the sake of religion. While al-Sindi understood "foreigners" as those who left their homeland to uphold the sunnah of the Prophet ("Dabiq," n.d.-e, p. 6-7).

ISIS, which was on control of Sham (Syria) benefited from a hadith that spoke of the virtues of the land of Sham that made it their propaganda material: "There will be hijrah after hijrah. The best people on earth are those who live in the place where Prophet Ibrahim (Sham) migrated, what

remains of the place other than Syria is the worst of humans. The earth will vomit them up, God will hate them, and the fire will gather them together with the monkeys and swine."("Dabiq," n.d.-e, p. 11).

While hijrah in Hizbut Tahrir's understanding looks more similar to ISIS compared to Qutb (IM) and Azzam (al-Qaeda). Hizbut Tahrir understands hijrah as an attempt to leave a country in the hands of the infidels and move to a Muslim country (Dar al-Islam). It is claimed based on the sunnah of the Prophet (Matusitz, 2013).

d. Theme IV: *Takfir*

The tendency to label other as *kafir* (disbeliever) is the next characteristic of radical groups, ranging from the Khawarij, Salafi-Wahhabi, Hizb-Tahrir, al-Qaeda, to ISIS; including the Ikhwanul Muslimin with its main character, Sayyid Qutb. Radical groups hold fast to the concept of monotheism *hakimiyah*; the claim of absolute legal obligation with God's law, there is no permissibility to take or adopt any sources/references other than those from God.

Based on the hadith, Qutb argues that the Prophet only permitted Muslims to take from one source without taking other sources. Sayyid Qutb also condemns someone who follows a system or rule made by humans, not only a system related to religion, but also a socio-cultural, economic, and political system. Qutb's thoughts regarding the categorization of infidels also had a great influence on al-Qaeda. This is especially the case of concerning refusal addressed to the government. This can be seen from the principles of the al-Qaeda struggle conveyed by Ayman al-Zawahiri in a speech in June 2005, which among the main points is the necessity of Muslims fighting to overthrow their country's leaders who are considered deviant from Islamic law (Mamduh, 2018). In addition to the point of

having to fight leaders who are considered infidels for not implementing Islamic law, al-Qaeda also adopt Qutb's thinking in terms of not allowing Muslims to hold elections and the obligation to take over control of energy sources which they believe to have been colonized by the West (Byman, 2015).

While for ISIS, they have a very extreme concept of faith. If someone who has pledged the creed but still believes and obeys the rules, systems, and legislation other than those that come from Allah, he is considered infidel and practicing apostasy. Qutb even mentions people who have made the shahada and then give obedience to the laws of human products, they have apostatized and have the right to be killed, the punishment for them later in the hereafter is more severe. Such an extreme view of faith and unbelief is based on several hadiths which of course they have constructed their understanding of, in addition to the verses of the Koran (QS. Al-Bayyinah: 5, QS. Al-Taubah: 5, QS. Al-Taubah: 11, and QS. Ali Imron: 32). Among the hadiths in question are:

"I was ordered to 'fight' people until they testify that there is no god but Allah and Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah, establishing pray and pay zakat. If they do, then their blood and wealth will be protected from me except by the right of Islam and the reckoning is with Allah." (Al-Bukhari, 1987, p. 25).

ISIS constructs the understanding of the hadith as follows, when the Prophet mentions the shahada and four other things in the form of prayer, zakat, fasting, and hajj simultaneously in one hadith, it shows that someone who has said the shahada, but ignores one of the other four things is still *kufir*, even though he believes in his obligations, and thus it is lawful to kill him, based on the command of the Prophet in the *uqatil* sentence (Jones, 2014).

About faith, ISIS also seems to be strongly influenced by Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab (d. 1206 H./1793 AD), the founder of the Wahhabi. This can be seen from the concepts of *al-wala'* and *al-bar'a'*; a demarcation line between friend and foe. This concept contains the doctrine of the obligation of a Muslim to break away from infidels, leave the land of infidels, instill enmity and hatred against infidels, and wage war against infidels until they are willing to apply the teachings of Islam. As a consequence of this doctrine, ISIS considers that there is no basis for brotherhood except group fanaticism (*ta'ifiyah*). Meanwhile, brotherhood of the same religion (*ukhuwah diniyah*), brotherhood of countrymen (*ukhuwah wataniyah*) and brotherhood of fellow human beings (*ukhuwah insaniyah*) do not exist for them and are not taught by Islam.

Interestingly the terminology of *al-wala'* and *al-bar'a'* is not found at all in the Koran or hadith. Theoretically, the first to introduce the doctrine was Muhammad bin Abdul Wahab, the founder of the Wahhabi sect, which was later annotated by his followers, Muhammad bin Saleh al-Uthaimin (d. 2001) in the book of *Syarah Usul al-Thalathah* and Saleh bin Fauzan al-Fauzan through his book, *al-Wala' wa al-Bara'*

e. Theme V: The End-Time Hadith

End-time concepts are among the most widely used as propaganda material by radical groups. It is not uncommon for people to commit acts of terror because of the end-time hadith narratives, such as the Surabaya Bombing perpetrators in 2018 (Haripin et al., 2020). Among the said hadith are that Islam will become foreign religions, hadith of the blessing of the land of Sham, the hadiths of the emergence of black flags, to the hadiths of the battle of the end of time (*al-malh amat al-kubra*).

One interesting fact related to terrorism in Indonesia is, every time a terrorist search occurs, a book on concept of the end-times is found. For example, on August 30, 2012 at the time of the arrest of the terror perpetrator with the initials MK in Cisaranten District, Bandung City; Apart from computers and laptops, some end-time-themed books were also confiscated.

The 524-page book consist of several hadiths quoted to strengthen the end-time narrative, ranging from the importance of war in Islam, the imminent battle at the end of time, signs of the apocalypse, the birth of Imam Mahdi, major changes in the world, to the establishment of the caliphate *'ala Minhaj al-nubuwah*. The book also contains propaganda and motivations for the struggle of the figures they call '*mujahideen*', including Abdullah Azzam (Abdullah, 2014).

Compared to the other three groups (IM, HT, and al-Qaeda), ISIS is more extensive in exploiting the the end-times narratives. *Al-malhamat al-kubra* or the great battle that will take place at the end of time, for example, occupies an important position in the ideological structure of ISIS. This battle is claimed to take place in Syria and its surroundings, namely Ghutah, Damascus, Dabiq (al-A'maq), the Furat River, Constantinople, Bayt al-Maqdis (Jerusalem), Lod, Lake Tiberius, Jordan River, Mount Sinai, and so on. This event is also related to the events of the descent of the Prophet Isa al-Masih, Imam Mahdi, and the appearance of the Dajjal, a very compelling narrative.

In its end-of-time narrative, ISIS claimed the end of this biggest and bloodiest battle would involve the Muslims led by Prophet Isa who will return to earth and the Romans led by the Dajjal. This battle will be won by

the Muslims. This also ends the triumph of Roman Christianity and marked the return of the glory of the caliphate (Gurr, Nadine., & Cole, 2002).

Reconstruction of the Purpose and Meaning of Hadith

The radical groups construction of hadith is problematic. Regarding the themes of khilafah and *hakimiyah*, for example, some inaccuracies were found when weighed using the method of hadith interpretation by ulema. Qutb's construction of understanding of hadith which states that it is forbidden to take references from outside the Koran and Sunnah or adopt a system outside of Islam is an unrealistic thought; revelation has stopped and the problems of Muslims continue to emerge dynamically. That's why the scholars added two sources of sharia (*masadir al-shari'ah*), in the form of ijmak and qiyas (Shaffat, 2021).

Closed, stubborn, and rigid thinking contradicts the spirit of revelation in the form of suggestions for thinking and creating as conveyed in many verses of the Koran, as well as hadith messages, such as the well-known one: "From Abu Hurairah he said, "The Messenger of Allah said: "A wisdom is an asset for a believer who is lost, then wherever he finds it, he is more entitled to take it." (Al-Darimi, n.d.). Ibn Hazm said that among the laws of Allah is to leave the determination of the law to other than Allah (RI, 2020).

The order to uphold the caliphate specifically did not find any guidance, either from the Koran or hadith. As emphasized by the Grand Mufti of Egypt, Ali Jum'ah, there is not a single verse or hadith that commands the adoption of a caliphate system. On the other hand, there is a threat from many hadiths for people who cause damage, create conflict, and incite division, which is the potential for the founders of the caliphate in the struggle to establish their caliphate. The fact today, almost all countries in

the world have a government, including Muslim-majority countries. Therefore, the discourse of the caliphate should no longer be needed (Schmid, 2015).

Even if these radical groups continue to insist on establishing a political entity in the form of a caliphate on legitimate and constitutional state territory, they can be categorized as *bughat*. There are many verses and hadiths advocating obedience to the leader and prohibiting rebellion. Violating the constitution or opposing the legitimate government was severely threatened by the Prophet, in his saying, "A person who sees something that is not liked by his government, he should be patient, because whoever separates from the unity of a country and then he dies, then dies in a state of ignorance." The term *jahiliyah* is addressed by the Prophet to those who oppose the state, in stark contrast to Sayyid Qutb's version of *jahiliyah*.

Jad al-Haq, who conducted research on hadith related to government, came to the statement that Islam forbids disobedience to a Muslim government even though it only practices Islamic law in the form of prayer (Al-Haq, n.d., p. 32). Since hundreds of years ago, even scholars have discussed the permissibility of *ta'adud al-aimmah* or the division of power of Muslim rulers, as stated by al-Qurtubi (Al-Qurtubi, 2008, p. 314). Likewise, with Ibn Taymiyah who allowed each Muslim region to have a government like Ali in Kufah and Muawiyah in Damascus (Taymiyah, 1998, p. 216).

The distribution of Muslim political power is not just a mere discourse, but a historical fact since the beginning of Islam. In the 3rd century AH, for example, Islamic political power was divided into three centers of government, namely the Abbasid dynasty with its capital in Iraq, 238

the Umayyad dynasty with its capital in Spain (317-423 AH), and the Fatimid dynasty with its capital in Egypt. 297-567 H) and Morocco (Hasan, 1953, p.20-21). Nadirsyah Hosen even stated that since the time of *Khulafa' al-Rashidin* and the Umayyads, as well as the beginning of the Abbasid era, Muslims have had diverse leadership, and it continues to this day (Hidayat, 2014, p. 156). Thus, the demand to unite the power of Muslims into one political entity is an ahistorical step. Ali never sentenced any Muslim who did not want to recognize his caliphate.

The term khilafah in the early days of Islam was not the same as that used by radical groups today, which meant the political unity of Muslim power. Because even during the distributed Islamic reign, the term used was still khilafah. In the 5th century hijri for example, some rulers called themselves caliphs. In Andalusia there were five people, each of whom proclaimed himself a caliph, in Egypt and Baghdad as well, even among the Alawites and the Khawarij they were not single. This is by the words of the Prophet narrated by Imam Muslim, that in the future there will be numbered caliphs. This is as quoted by al-Mubarakfuri (w. 2006) (Al-Bukhari, 1987, p. 1273).

To Raghib al-Asfihani, jihad has three dimensions: the effort to fight the visible enemy, the effort to fight the devil, and the effort to fight the lust (Al-Asfihani, n.d., p. 101). While Ibn al-Jauzi, when interpreting the QS. Al-Hajj verse 78, cites a broader but simpler opinion about the meaning of jihad, that is the effort to do all obedience. And according to him, that is the opinion of the majority of scholars (Jauzi, 2005, p. 331). Historically, the command of jihad has come down since the Prophet was still in Mecca and had not migrated to Medina. Although there was no physical war at that time. This also shows that jihad is not only defined as war.

Ikrimah, Ibn Zubair, and Hasan Basri, as well as the majority of commentators, agree that the verse is Makkiyah. Jihad in this verse means to preach politely, introduce the Koran and convey its contents to people who do not yet believe, invite people to embrace Islam without being afraid of the risks that may befall them, and be steadfast in the face of all kinds of torture and insults as has been experienced. The Prophet when expelled and stoned by the residents of Taif (Al-Buthi, 1993, p. 19). Indeed, one form of jihad is physical warfare in self-defense. Basically, Islam hates and despises war.

As for the theme of hijrah, which is defined by radical groups as moving from an infidel country to the land of the caliphate, the references they use need to be compared with other more authentic hadiths; The Prophet emphasized that the order to migrate, after the conquest of Mecca, had ceased: From Ibn 'Abbas RA, he said, the Messenger of Allah (SAW) said at the time of the conquest of Mecca that, "There is no more migration, there is jihad and intention. If you are assigned to go for jihad, then go." (Al-Bukhari, 1987, p. 2912).

The hadith was narrated by Imam al-Bukhārī (d. 256 H) in the book *al-Jāmi 'al-Shahīh* chapter *Fadl al-Jihād wa al-Siri* through the path of the companions of Ibn 'Abbas. Also narrated by Muslim in chapter *al-Mubaya'ah Ba'da Fath Makkah 'ala al-Islam* and Imam Ahmad in Musnad 'Abdullah Ibn 'Abbas Ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib. The status of the hadith is valid with the highest predicate because it was narrated by Imam Bukhari and Imam Muslim and others. Yet in reality, the hijrah in the phenomenon of radical groups is contrary to the meaning of the *tarku al-manhiyat*, their hijrah invites exclusivism, group fanaticism, accompanied by misdirection or even rejection of other groups, something that is prohibited by religion.

While regarding to takfiri, most ulema agree that the formulation of the indications of disbelief is not intended to justify or pass judgments against certain individuals or groups of infidels. It is to be a reminder to ourselves to be careful and stay away from things that can fall into disbelief. Punishment for people who leave Islam has indeed been imposed at the beginning of Islam, but not because of that factor alone; it was given because at that time apostasy was always accompanied by treason and resistance to the state. Thus, the state took repressive measures. As written by Nasarudin Umar, it is not included in the criminal criteria that can be sentenced (Umar, 2014, p. 168).

Nasarudin Umar's opinion is in line with Grand Sheikh al-Azhar, Mahmud Shaltut who stated that the act of leaving Islam alone does not justify one's blood, what justifies is enmity and resistance to Muslims, or discrediting his teachings in public. Even some contemporary scholars reject punishment for apostates in general, as has been done in the past. The hadith that is the basis for punishing apostates is also *ahad*, weak.

Another theme that is heralded by radical groups is the end-time narrative. Hizbut Tahrir, for example, always cites the hadith of the Prophet who talks about the emergence of a caliphate at the end of time. Likewise, ISIS has always carried the hadith of the priority of the country of Sham in its hijrah propaganda. They shift the general words of the Prophet as the legitimacy of phenomena with special connotations. Regarding the re-emergence of end-time discourses as doctrinal narratives or propaganda and the exploitation and understanding of these hadith, al-Āḥ al-Dīn bin Aḥmad al-Idlibi, a contemporary scholar from Syria wrote a special book entitled *Aḥādīth Faḍā'il al-Syām Dirāsah Naqdiyyah*. The book contains a critical and in-depth study of end-time traditions, especially those relating

to the land of Sham, a location that is said to be the site of the end-time battle and an area once controlled by radical groups.

Al-Idlibi writes that the hadith related to the end-time, including those that talk about the great battle in Sham, majority of the sanad are problematic (Al-Idlibi, n.d., p. 27-47). It cannot be used as *hujjah*. Before al-Idlibi, Rashid Rida had also said that many end-time hadiths were narrated by Ka'b al-Akhbar, Wahab bin Munabbih, and other ex-ahl al-kitab narrators who mostly narrated *Israiliyat* (Tammulis & Arsyad, 2021).

CONCLUSION

The understanding construction of radical groups represented by the Ikhwanul Muslimin, Hizb al-Tahrir, Al-Qaeda, and ISIS towards the Prophet's hadith in the themes of *hakimiyah*, *takfir*, *jihad*, *hijrah*, and the end-time violates the principal and methodology of hadith studies that guides the majority of hadith scholars, such as in terms of the weakness of the validation process, the absence of *maqasid al-shari'ah* considerations, the absence of comparisons of one hadith text with another hadith, and the lack of depth in aspects of *asbab al-wurud*, and not optimal in applying Arabic grammar in determining *madlul al-hadith*. The understanding of these distorted radical groups often has a political background, is fanatical, and is selfish and hypocritical. Several constructions of understanding of the hadith are often just a means of claiming to fight for their political propaganda. The majority of scholars around the world, who are moderate in fact, reject the construction of this radical group's understanding of the Prophet's traditions because in addition to using *daif* hadiths, even *mawdu*, in their *hujjah* they also have fatal methodological errors. Therefore,

radicalism in the name of religion is a form of exploitation and distortion of religious texts.

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